digitalcommons.nyls.edu
Faculty Scholarship

Articles & Chapters

2001

Introduction: Towards Understanding South
African Constitutionalism
Penelope Andrews
New York Law School, penelope.andrews@nyls.edu

Stephen Ellmann
New York Law School, stephen.ellmann@nyls.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters
Part of the International Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Andrews, Penelope and Ellmann, Stephen, "Introduction: Towards Understanding South African Constitutionalism" (2001). Articles
& Chapters. 1076.
https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters/1076

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles & Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@NYLS.

To Wendy, Colleen and Keith, with love
-P.A.

To Nancy, with love
-S.E.
To the following pathbreaking lawyers who are
no longer with us, but whose lifelong works are
reflected in this volume:
Haywood W Burns
John Didcott
Shanara Gilbert
Ismail Mahomed
Etienne Mureinik
Godfrey Pitje

The Post-Apartheid
Constitutions
Perspectives on South Africa's Basic Law

Edited by

Penelope Andrews
and

Stephen Ellmann
Foreword by

Nelson Mandela

WU;>.
. press
W1twatersrandU"
mvers1ty
OHIO UNIVERSITY PRESS, ATHENS .

The Post-Apartheid Constitutions is a joint publication of:
Witwatersrand University Press
1 Jan Smuts Avenue
2001 Johannesburg
South Africa
ISBN 186814 345 7
© Witwatersrand University Press 2001

/(;~
""'),() 1 (.,

/j761
?l.,;()

I

C, V

and
Ohio University Press
Scott Quadrangle
Athens, OH 45701
ISBN 0-8214-1400-3
Library·of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
The post-apartheid constitutions: perspectives on South Africa's basic law/edited
by Penelope Andrews and Stephen Ellmann.
p.cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-8214-1400-3 (alk. paper)
1. Constitutional law - South Africa.
2. Constitutional history - South Africa.
3. Apartheid - South Africa.
I. Andrews, Penelope. II. Ellmann, Stephen.
KTL2070.P67 2001 .
342.68-dc21
2001021166
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a
retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic,
mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission
of the copyright owners.

First published in 2001
Typesetting and Cover Design by Lebone Publishing Services, Johannesburg
Index by Mirie van Rooyen
Printed and bound by NBD, Drukkery Street, Goodwood, Cape Town

Acknowledgments
We have had the happy opportunity to work together on this book and learn
from each other over a number of years. We are also indebted to many people
who have assisted us both in this project. Needless to say, we thank each of the
authors for their contributions and for their collegial responses to our many
inquiries. We also thank each of the participants in the Law and Society
Association panels from which this book evolved. We are grateful as well to Pat
Tucker, our editor at Witwatersrand University Press, for her encouragement
and her very hard work in making this project a reality, to her colleague Melanie
Pequeux, and to Gillian Berchowitz, who welcomed the book to Ohio University
Press.
In addition, we thank the following people for their assistance, advice and
support.: Taunya Banks, Tom Karls, Jonathan Klaaren, Nancy Rosenbloom, David
Schneiderman, Clifford Shearing, Vivian Stoffels, Napoleon Williams and
Randall Williams. Daniel Curtin provided reserach assistance; Sue Chang,
secretarial assistance; and Marta Kiszely and Kate McLeod, assistance at the
New York Law School Mendik Law Library. Finally, we thank Dean Kristin
Booth Glen and the Professional Development Committee of CUNY Law School,
and Deans Harry Wellington and Richard Matasar of New York law School for
financial support of this work.
We also gratefully acknowledge permission to use previously published
material in the articles of Heinz Klug (from Klug: Constituting Democracy,
Cambridge University Press, 2000. Reproduced with the permission of
Cambridge University Press) and Firoz Cachalia (from Davis and Cheadle (eds):
Fundamental Rights in the Constitution: Commentary and Cases, Juta, 1997.
Reproduced with the permission of Juta ).
PENELOPE ANDREWS
STEPHEN ELLMANN

X

Introduction:
Towards Understanding
South African Constitutionalism
Penelope Andrews & Stephen Ellmann

A fter Nelson Mandela's release from prison in 1990, South African leaders
.tl.from across the political spectrum embarked on an ambitious project of
nation building and constitution making. The process was difficult and delicate, .
driven by the obvious need to accomplish diverse and often contradictory aims.
For the framers of the new constitutional order, encoding the desires and
aspirations of all South Africans in one document was both a symbolic and
substantive precondition for its legitimacy. Constitutions, after all, are generally
a measure of a society's faith, but also of its fears. While reflecting the wishes of
those who choose to govern - wishes associated with order and control - they
must also incorporate the yearning for protection from those who are governed.
They must mark the contours of the future while confirming the bitter lessons
learned from the past. They must adroitly balance needs and aspirations on
the one hand, with practicalities and limitations on the other.
All this South Africa's constitution makers undertook. Their first step, a
triumph of democracy achieved at negotiating tables to which no one had been
elected, was the Interim Constitution. Born from South Africa's volatile history
of repression, violence and discrimination, it was crafted through a protracted
process of negotiation and compromise, a process often marred by widespread
public disturbance, acrimonious debate and unspeakable violence. It laid out a
structure for South.Africa's governance to last for five years, from 1994 to 1999,
and specified as well the process by which the first elected Parliament, sitting
as a Constitutional Assembly, would write a final constitution - a process that
ultimately was capped with success in 1996.
This book studies both the processes of negotiation and the results. It began
at a conference of the Law & Society Association in mid-1994. At that time,
South Africa's Interim Constitution had been in effect for just a few months.
The work of writing a final constitution had just begun. As the organisers of a
~eries of panels on the South African constitution, we aimed to bring the
important news from South Africa to the attention of North American academics,
and we hoped also to contribute to South African thinking the perspectives of
a diverse range of observers and participants, black and white, South African
and non-South African.
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The Processes of Constitution Writing
The road from that beginning to this book was longer than we thought it
would be at the time. Some papers presented in 1994 were overtaken by events;
Intractable conflicts around the world make it clear that South Africa's successful
new papers were written, some by participants in the 1994 meetings and some
transition from racial oppression to democracy was never inevitable. The initial
by other scholars and political actors. The new papers helped make this bo?k
gulfs between the contesting parties were immense. Trusting personal
what it is now: a commentary on the processes that led, through the Intenm
relationships across the divides of politics did not come automatically, and
Constitution, to the 1996 Constitution, and a study of a number of central issues
sometimes did not come at all. The issues that had to be settled required all
of human rights and institutional structure under the latter. There are other
sides to rethink long-held predispositions - including such fundamental matters
books on this subject, and rightly so, for the South African Constitution deserves
as the ANC' s opposition to federalism, the NP' s insistence on minority vetoes,
the attention of constitutionalists around the world. But this book is, like the
· and both sides' hesitation about unfettered judicial enforcement of a bill of
1994 conference sessions, an effort to bring together a particularly wide and
rights. Settlement also required creativity, as the country fashioned transitional
cross-cutting set of views.
mechanisms essentially without precedent anywhere in the world. Meanwhile,
We present here the reflections of politicians and academics, participants
violence was always present and the possibility of far worse bloodletting was
and observers. Three contributors were themselves leaders of the negotiation
never far from the surface. How did So_µth Africa do it?
process, and on opposite sides: Roel£ Meyer and Leon Wessels for the National
Leon Wessels' s essay provides a part of the answer, Here, in an article aptly
Party (NP), Cyril Ramaphosa for the African National Congress (ANC). Several
subtitled 'The Liberation and Confession of an Afrikaner', Wessels tells the story
others also participated in important ways in the framing of the new
of his own gradual realisation of the injustice of apartheid and the massive
constitutions. They include Hassen Ebrahim, Christina Mu_rray, Kate Savage
changes that would be required to right that wrong. Wessels' s story, while in a
and Dennis Davis. A number have been actively engaged in implementing the
sense the story of the reformist wing of the National Party, is also uniquely his
new Constitution in governmental positions: to name only those not already , own. He describes his effort to help a couple whose marriage was illegal under
mentioned, Nicholas Haysom was counsel to President Mandela, Karthy
the race laws; the solution, arranged with the Minister of Internal Affairs, was
Govender now serves on the Human Rights Commission, Firoz Cachalia is the
to magically reclassify the 'coloured' wife as white, but Wessels's response was
majority leader of the Gauteng legislature, and Patric Mtshaulana was a law
to be 'appalled by the farce'. In one encounter after another, Wessels listens to ·
clerk to Constitutional Court President Arthur Chaskalson-during the Court's
the people he meets, and is moved by what he hears. Yet more than an open
first·years. Others have pressed legal claims from positions outside the
heart was required for the transformation that South Africa needed. Wessels,
government. These include Bongani Majola of the Legal Resources Centre and
after all, was a politician. He apologised for apartheid at a conference in Oslo
Sandra Liebenberg of the University of the Western Cape's Community Law
and at the same conference staged a handshake with Nelspn Mandela as part
Centre. Some writers bring academic perspectives shaped by experience both
of an effort to avoid irrevocably losing the audience to Mandela. So, too, the
in South Africa and elsewhere: Penelope Andrews (Australia, the United States
negotiations that ensued were built on remarkable personal encounters and South Africa), and Stephen Ellmann, Diana Gordon, Jonathan Klaaren,
Wessels describes his first meeting with Chris Hani and his swim with Joe Slovo
Heinz Klug and Stuart Woolman (all with longstanding connections to both
- but also required 'a commitment to negotiate and to be loyal to the
South Africa and the United States). One other writer, Carmel Rickard, brings
constitution-making process', an acceptance of the need for compromise, and
the special insights of a long career covering South African law as a journalist
the ability to candidly sell those compromises to one's constituency. Yet in the
and now as a legal scholar as well.
end the story Wessels tells is not one of calculation but of commitment, and
Listing the authors is not, of course, enough to demonstrate the ways in
this is nowhere expressed more clearly than in his recalling that he decided
which their essays add to the study of South Africa's Constitution. This
never again to sing the old national anthem Die Stem (The Voice of South Africa),
introduction therefore offers an overview, necessarily summary and incomplete,
but that on 26 April 1994 the coming of the new South Africa and the singing of
of each author's contribution. We begin with the series of articles that focus
Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrika 'allowed me and many other South Africans the freedom
primarily on the complex political and judicial processes that produced South
to sing The Voice of South Africa with emotion and pride'.
Africa's constitutions. Then we turn to a group of articles that look closely at
Roel£ Meyer, writing with Professor Bennie Marais, also tells the story of
some of the rights that the new constitutions protect, and finally we discuss
the negotiations (focusing on the framing of the Interim Constitution) from the
several articles that focus on the institutions created or reshaped by the new
National Party side. Meyer and Cyril Rall}aphosa developed a relationship of
constitutions to protect these rights.
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trust that clearly played a critical part in making agreement possible; Meyer
observes that 'it was a necessity that Cyril Ramaphosa and I should trust each
other in full. Our view became that there was no problem that we could not
resolve'. Again, this does not mean that the government's negotiators were
simply yielding to the truths brought home to them by the ANC. Meyer notes
the government's tactical coups and failures, and emphasises that the ANC, as
well as other parties, made substantial concessions to achieve agreement. He
sees the credibility that 'we as Government negotiators achieved' as having
made it possible for them to take firm stands in the negotiations, and to [keep]
our bargaining power after we had lost all our partners'. Meyer's account also
indirectly reveals, however, how crucial and sometimes difficult it must have
been for the negotiators who grasped the urgency of change to bring their
party with them. He tells us, for instance that it took nine months for him to get
the government's consent to the idea of the government of national unity.
Similarly, Meyer tells us that a constitutional framework for the Interim
Constitution, developed by Professor Francois Venter, became 'the backbone
of our negotiations ... The government approved of it, thus it had cabinet status,
and I could bind my colleagues to it.' Meyer also comments that his relationship
with his 'principal', F W de Klerk, was important to the negotiation process.
[While] Meyer does not elaborate on this point Wessels's comment is striking:
'[While] we had won the internal arguments and debates at the World Trade
Centre negotiations with the assistance of De Klerk, we had not always done
' so under his leadership.'
Cyril Ramaphosa tells the story of the negotiations through to the adoption
of the proposed text of the final Constitution on 8 May 1996. His account is less
personal than Meyer's or Wessels' s, though he too mentions the 'disarming
exchanges' at the first negotiation between the government and the ANC at
Groote Schuur in 1990, and the 'smiles and handshakes all round' after the
Constitutional Assembly vote on 8 May. Ramaphosa reminds us very firmly of
the extent of the divisions between the National Party and the ANC (he also
discusses the ANC's dealings with other parties, from the 'ANC's persistence
in engaging in bilaterals with the right wing' to the dispute with the Inkatha
Freedom Party over international mediation)". He sees the government as a
very reluctant negotiator, aiming to lock the ANC 'into protracted, fruitless
negotiations, while the structures of the ANC on the ground would have been
rendered ineffective by the ongoing violence', which itself was' an orchestrated
element of the NP' s negotiating strategy'. It is all the more remarkable, in light
of this account of the conflicting strategies of the two sides, that the negotiators
were able to establish the degree of personal trust that they did. While
Ramaphosa emphasises that the ANC set much of the course of the negotiations,
he recognises that it also made concessions. It seems, moreover, that making
these concessions was not always easy. Ramaphosa acknowledges that '[t]he
4

lines of communication between negotiators and their constituencies - between
the ANC leadership and the membership -were generally poor'. In particular,
it appears that the idea of a government of national unity was difficult for both
sides to accept. Meyer, as already noted, had trouble selling it to his constituency,
while Ramaphosa says that Joe Slovo had 'the unenviable task' of winning
ANC support for this and related concessions. Ramaphosa writes that the
endorsement of these concessions 'was a brave and far-sighted move for the
ANC, preceded by much frank debate and soul searching'. Much the same
might well be said of central decisions by the other side.
-The negotiators' accounts of personal interaction and strategic clashes
underline the question of whether the South African constitutions should be
seen, as Hassen Ebrahim puts it, as 'the product of the power of persuasion or
the persuasion of power'. Certainly, as Ebrahim makes clear, power was wielded.
The parties approached the task of creating an Interim Constitution with the
recognition that neither side could simply force its will on the other, but each
side, or elements on each side, continued to seek leverage with the means at its
disposal. As Ebrahim observes, '[a]lmost every massacre during this period
took place either before a postponement in talks or after a major breakthrough'.
The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) pressed its case by
'organising mass action, boycotts, strikes and stay-aways'. And the right wing
actually invaded the negotiations at the World Trade Centre. Ebrahim
emphasises what Ramaphosa's account implies: that mistrust as well as trust
Was part of the negotiation process. Indeed, at one point 'Ramaphosa exchanged
such harsh words with Meyer that it was feared that a nearly complete
agreementwould be placed in the balance'. Yet true persuasion was also an
important part of the process. As Ebrahim reminds us, Nelson Mandela himself
had initiated negotiations from his prison cell. Thabo Mbeki apparently talked
the National Party into accepting 'the importance of an interim government to
manage the transition', while Roel£ Meyer pressed on the ANC an argument
that there needed to be an interim constitution as well. Indeed, Ebrahim
maintains that 'it is the fact that [the Constitution] represents a comfortable
collection of previously intractable political positions that provides it with its
vibrant quality'.
As several of the contributors emphasise, there was more to this process
than simply an interaction, reasoned or forced, between negotiators. The public
Was also involved. Christina Murray, for example, recounts the multi-faceted
campaign by the Constitutional Assembly (CA) to make all South Africans aware
of the constitution-writing process. 'You've made your mark now have your
say,' the CA told the country. Many did have their say- more than two million
~eople submitted comments, whether in petitions, technical arguments, or less
finely crafted writing that 'captured the aspirations of a young nation on the
brink of change'. The CA asserted in a poster that 'The Constitution is being
5
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written by the most important person in the country: You!', but Murray
comments that this poster 'might be criticised for being misleading'. She
acknowledges that the two million people who commented did not directly
shape the Constitution, but she maintains that the campaigns for public input
nevertheless had meaning: they 'might' facilitate "ownership" of the Constitution by all South Africans by ensuring that it was not drafted by an isolated
political elite, and by fostering an active interest in it in all communities'. At the
same time, a 'technical refinement team' paradoxically had the rather
controversial task of writing the document in plain English, a process that aimed
to deliver to the South African people a Constitution they might more fully
own because they could more easily read it. The same team aimed 'to give the
text an active and enabling tone rather than a regulatory tone', and scoured
the text's language to free it from linguistic gender discrimination.
While the Constitutional Assembly sought to give the public 'ownership'
of the new basic law, various groups from civil society- in American parlance,
interest groups - sought to place their imprint on particular aspects of the
Constitution. For example, the prohibition of unfair discrimination based on
sexual orientation may reflect the impact of advocates for gay and lesbian rights.
Heinz Klug discusses the influence on the Interim Constitution of women's
groups, who successfully prevailed over another civil society group- traditional
African leaders - in giving gender equality primacy over the claims of
discriminatory tradition. Similarly, as Klug recounts, white and black ethnic
groups, in particular conservative Afrikaners and Zulus supporting the Inkatha
Freedom Party, also won protections for their claims, notably in the
Constitutional Principles attached to the Interim Constitution that obliged the
negotiators of the final constitution to respect, or at least entertain, some claims
for group self-determination within the new South Africa. Klug also observes
that with the transition 'from a non-elected negotiations forum' - responsible
for the Interim Constitution - to the elected Constitutional Assembly that wrote
the final Constitution, 'the emphasis of participation [shifted] away from mass
action or public demonstrations towards a more individualistic, yet equally
active, form of participation through discussion meetings and the making of
formal submissions to the CK In late 1995, he tells us, only 'groups who felt
that they were not adequately represented' were demonstrating, although
COSATU did return to earlier modes of politics in the last days of April 1996
when it called a national strike on the lockout issue. Whatever the mode of
civil society intervention, it remained significant; Ebrahim observes that the
last three issues to be resolved in 1996, dealing with the supposed right to
lockout, the constitutional protection of property and the right to singlelanguage education, were all 'issues around which the civil society lobby was
most vigorous'.

6

Katharine Savage's essay illuminates these complex interactions. It begins
with a detailed outline of the for)llal Constitutional Assembly structures, as
well as a description of the different formats of informal negotiations,
multilateral and bilateral. These structures were certainly important - the CA
was a much more stable structure than the Convention for a Democratic South
Africa, and the informal channels were quite solid as well, so that, as Murray
says, '[o]ccasionally one would encounter Ramaphosa himself settled
comfortably with a whisky discussing ways of resolving seemingly intractable
problems with his National Party counterpart, Roel£ Meyer'. But all the
experience of successful negotiation, and all the structures, did not suffice to
bring the parties in the CA to agreement without crisis in the final days.
Savage focuses on 'three tightly negotiated and highly contested clauses'
dealing with education, property and the lockout. Her account emphasises the
ANC's newly attained power, and its willingness to use that power; the ANC
insisted, for example, that there should be no right to single-language schools,
and ultimately extracted the NP's agreement to this as part of the final multiissue compromise. At the same time, Savage points to the ANC's need for
consensus (Murray similarly emphasises that no one wanted to settle the
Constitution by referendum instead of negotiation) and illustrates theANC's
Willingness to compromise even on some very important questions.
The complexity of the negotiations and the lengths to which the parties
were prepared to go to try to find common ground are reflected in Savage's
detailed account of negotiations on the property clause. The ANC entered the
negotiations over the final Constitution determined to rectify what were seen
as excessive concessions made on the issue of a right to property in the Interim
Constitution. 1 Savage reports that the ANC carefully 'ensure[d] that the views
of the major constituencies lobbying the party were canvassed until hours before
the clause was finalised'. But while the ANC resisted a constitutional'guarantee'
of property, in the course of elaborate negotiations it repeatedly offered to accept
language obliging the state to 'respect property' or' the institution of property'.
The National Party approached acceptance of similar language in a negotiating
draft which it 'marked as a "non-paper'", to which the ANC chose to resr,ond
despite its questionable status. In the end, the ANC refused to go further than
this, and the National Party drew back from it, preferring no entrenchment of
any property right to language, merely requiring respect for the institution of
property. Then, ironically, in the final days of negotiations the parties almost
deadlocked over a different property issue, namely whether land reform and
similar measures could be enacted despite the property provisions agreed upon
and without satisfying the usual requirements for limitations on constitutional
rights. On this issue, perhaps ultimately a more important one than the choice
0
~ language endorsing or not endorsing property rights as such, the ANC
)'lelded, agreeing that land reform limitations on property rights would have
7
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to satisfy the usual test for limiting any right. 'The result,' Savage writes, 'left
certain ANC negotiators and advisers who had been integrally involved in
negotiations on the clause bitterly unhappy.'
Even these intricate interactions do not reflect the full complexity of the
forces shaping South Africa's new Constitutions. The detailed minuet of the
negotiations only took place because the parties had chosen, or been driven to
the negotiating table in the first place. That was hardly inevitable; the vision of
South Africa's leaders, including Nelson Mandela and F W de Klerk, the West's
pressure on South Africa's government, and the Communist East's decline as a
source of support for the ANC, all contributed to the parties' arrival at the
table. There they undertook a somewhat remarkable task, namely to use law to
reform South Africa. The negotiators sought to give the South African people·
ownership of this new basic law, and they profoundly reshaped South Africa's
legal system by establishing constitutional supremacy over the legislature and
creating a new Constitutional Court. Nevertheless, they maintained some
measure of continuity with a system in which, as Martin Chanock has
emphasised, law's claims to liberal virtue fitted poorly with its role in a vicious
system of subjugation. 2
Both the government and the ANC came to the notion of judicially
enforceable human rights quite late. Heinz Klug emphasises the extent to which
the negotiators were constrained by an international, 'post-cold war hegemony
of an American-style constitutionalism'. Klug writes that '[f]or the ANC the
shift from a rhetoric of people's power, democratic centralism and state socialist
models ... to an embracing of constitutional democracy and a bill of rights was
grounded in the movement's ability to draw on its own rights-based tradition'.
Dennis Davis is perhaps more sceptical. While observing that for the National
Party 'a Bill of Rights became one of the major instruments with which ... [it]
sought to achieve a nonracial society with a minimum of transformative
potential,' he argues that the ANC initially endorsed judicial enforcement only
of traditional, 'first generation' rights and reads leading ANC figures as
otherwise aiming at centralised social reconstruction for which judicial intrusion
was seen as a potential hindrance.
Davis's scepticism makes the ultimate elaboration and protection of rights
in the Constitutions seem all the more remarkable. How did it ever come about?
He suggests that the initial impetus towards comprehensive rights protection
in the Interim Constitution came not from the politicians but from the members
of the 'Technical Committee', who broadly construed their drafting mandate
and thereby gave the National Party, already eager to enact as many limits on
the new government's power as possible, a 'supreme tactical advantage'. But
Davis .also emphasises that the NP and ANC found common ground in
(somewhat ambiguously) limiting the Bill of Rights to vertical rather than
horizontal application, a result that he believes met the NP' s desire to insulate
8

a sphere of private life and privilege from constitutional scrutiny, while also
according with ANC desires to have a constitutionally free hand in making
socio-economic reforms. The second time around, however, in the negotiations
for the final Constitution, the ANC made clear that' exclusive verticality was a
non-starter' and '[b]ecause the political temperature had not been raised on
this issue, the legal experts had considerable scope for imposing their own
solution'. At the start of April 1996, in a negotiating session at the seaside resort
of Arniston, while politicians focused on other issues, Davis reports that two
~echnical advisors, Halton Cheadle and Etienne Mureinik, 'had agreed that the
issue of horizontality should be resolved by way of a mediating role for the
common law'. This agreement led to the final Constitution's section 8, which
makes clear that the Bill of Rights can apply to private relationships and, in
Davis's view, directs that this application take place through development of
the common Iaw rather than through 'a direct form of horizontality'. Davis
sees this provision as potentially revolutionary, but also argues that in the years
after its adoption it has had little impact, and concludes with the observation
th~t _'whether the demand for change proves stronger than the tenacity of
existing legal traditions will probably determine the extent of the influence of
th~ 1996 Constitution in the reconstitution of South African society'. (Later in
this volume, Ellmann offers another analysis of this clause and its potential
meaning.)
. A_ reader unfamiliar with South African history might be forgiven for
thi~~ng at this point that the South African miracle was the result entirely of
political actiop, mediated by skilful technical advice. Perhaps the most
remarkable of the mechanisms South Africa devised for its own transition,
however, was its use of the judiciary. The multi-party negotiations that produced
the Interim Constitution also produced a set of Constitutional Principles that
Would bind the drafters of the final Constitution, and an institution, the
Constitutional Court, which would have the power to reject a draft that did
not comply with those principles. The Constitutional Court, itself a creation of
the Interim Constitution, was the first South African court to be chosen after
the end of apartheid and the first to exercise without challenge the power to
hold acts of other branches of the government unconstitutional. It was also
perhaps the first constitutional court anywhere in the world to be granted the
Power to hold a constitution unconstitutional.
t . Carmel Rickard tells the story of the Constitutional Court's performance of
hi~ duty. To some extent, of course, this story cannot be known, because the
deliberations of the Court are confidential. In another respect, this story is
alr~ady available to every reader of the Constitutional Court's judgements,
Which state the Court's reasoning and conclusions in detail. But Rickard, who
attended the two weeks of oral argument that began on 1 July 1996, is able to
tell a part of the story that otherwise (because of the lack of usable official
9

Introduction

The Post-Apartheid Constitutions

recordings of the arguments) would be lost to us. This is the story of the justices'
public engagement with the issues of certification. As she emphasises, this is a
story of justices expressing questions and uncertainties, often in vivid language;
it is in marked contrast to the formal story told in the studiedly cool language
of the Court's decisions. The justices wrestle with a series of profound questions,
including the degree of deference due to the Constitutional Assembly; the
problem of interpreting ambiguous constitutional provisions and of binding
future courts to adhere to the certification judgement's interpretations; and
the task of understanding and respecting the dictates of the 'solemn pact' by
which the negotiators of the Interim Constitution bound the Constitutional
Assembly. As Rickard also emphasises, however, the certification story is not
only a story of the justices' interaction with counsel. The court took
extraordinary steps to elicit public comments, and ultimately heard oral
argument from one lay person (Mr Beema Naidoo, who argued that Indian
languages were not sufficiently protected in the new Constitution). Organised
political parties also played a crucial part. The National Party and the Democratic
Party voted for the Constitution in the Constitutional Assembly but challenged
it in court; this two-front strategy now seems to be accepted practice. The
Inkatha Freedom Party and the Conservative Party, each of which had pulled
out of the negotiations process, both opted in to the certification litigation.
It might well have been feared that entrusting to a court the authority to
hold the Constitution unconstitutional would impose on the justices duties
that were essentially political rather than judicial - perhaps most clearly, the
task of weighing whether provincial powers in the new Constitution were
substantially less than those in the Interim Constitution, a task that consumed
a great deal of the court's attention - and that the result would be to delegitimise
the Court rather than to legitimise the Constitution. In fact, however, the
Constitutional Court, sympathetic as it clearly is to the new order, rejected the
first version of the final Constitution. This decision was accepted calmly by the
political authorities, who rewrote the draft to meet the Court's specifications.
Rickard suggests that the success of the entire process reflected the Court's
own' growing reputation for independence', its welcoming of wide participation
in the process, its careful choice of tone in the ultimate judgement, as well as
the coverage by the media and the response of the politicians. Using a metaphor
offered by the late Ismail Mohamed during the oral argument, she writes that
the certification process brought the airplane of the Constitution down 'safely
within the lights of the runway'.

The six articles focusing on human rights in the new constitutions offer a
window on the achievements and aspirations, but also the possible limitations,
of the new basic law. While by no means a survey of all of the important rights

issues now facing South Africa, these articles illuminate several of the most
important fields now in development. They address the right to citizenship;
the right to equality, in particular with respect to gender; rights to cultural
freedom; socioeconomic rights; the applicability of the Bill of Rights to private
actors; and free speech rights, in particular in the courts.
Jonathan Klaaren takes up a right that in the United States has been called
'the right to have rights',3 the right to citizenship. In South Africa, the right to
citizenship is in a sense less fundamental since, as Klaaren points out, most of
the rights in the Bill of Rights are guaranteed to 'everyone' rather than just to
citizens. Moreover, citizenship in South Africa has, at long last, been stripped
of its apartheid racialised centre. But Klaaren' s examination of legal
developments around citizenship, and particularly tti.e influence of international
human rights norms on this issue in South Africa, leads him to a decidedly
mixed assessment of the state of citizenship in the new nation. He emphasises
that post-apartheid South Africa has experienced a large-scale migration across
its borders, and this demographic shift serves as a backdrop to his legal
discussion. Here he notes the Constitutional Court's confirmation of the rights
of n~m-citizens, or at any rate the rights of non-citizens with lawful permanent
resident status, in a 1998 decision that struck down as 'discriminatory'
regulations of the Department of Education that barred foreigners from
~ermanent employment as teachers in state schools.4 He also emphasises the
important educational and legal role played by the Human Rights Commission
in this area, particularly in connection with refugee rights. But he points out
that, despite the Constitution's protection, legislation and regulations contain
many distinctions between citizens and non-citizens. Indeed, in t]Je final
Constitution, in good part at the instance of the ANC, South Africa restricted to
C~tizens two rights that the Interim Constitution had granted to everyone - the
right to reside anywhere in the nation and the right to select an occupation. In
the field of popular legal culture, moreover, Klaaren finds grave reason for
concern, in the' contestation of citizenship' playing out on the streets, sometimes
Violently. He concludes that a concept of 'post-national citizenship' - in which
people enjoy rights and duties as people, rather than as members of particular
nation-states - 'is both losing ground and losing steam', and more broadly
cautions us that '[i]n citizenship as well as beyond, the human rights character
of constitutional law cannot be taken for granted'.
Penelope Andrews focuses on equality, certainly one of the central concerns
?f the new constitutional order, and in particular on women's status and rights
in post-1994 South Africa. She draws attention to specific ways in which
apartheid ensured the perpetuation of women's subordinate status, while
pointing out that traditional institutions and laws also played their part. As she
explains, a combination of apartheid (European) and traditional laws and
attitudes (African) culminated in a peculiar brand of South African masculinity,
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one that surely contributes to the current widespread violence against women.
Women have mobilised in response to these conditions, and Andrews discusses
the efforts they have made to shape the Constitution so as to remedy these
problems, notes the achievements embodied in the constitutional text, and
points to the relevance for South African women of the impressive theoretical
and organisational strides towards achieving gender equality made by global
feminists and activists in the last few decades. At the same time, she points to
the enormous resources - economic, legal, political and cultural- that will need
to be harnessed in order to overcome the stubborn obstacles to women's
emancipation. Although she is ultimately optimistic about the capacity of
women to ensure that women's rights are not afforded a secondary place in
the national transformation agenda, she believes that women will need to be
consistently vigilant about ensuring that their issues remain central to national
debates. In this appraisal of a nation embracing equality as a value but struggling
to implement it in practice, Andrews's account of gender equality in South
Africa surely exemplifies the current struggle for equality on many other fronts
as well.
South Africa is a country of great diversity as well as great inequality, and
so it faces particularly acutely the task of respecting differences while also .
ensuring equality and impartial, effective governance. Firoz Cachalia explores •
these issues in his essay on 'Constitutionalism and Belonging'. Firmly rejecting ;
consociationalism- as an ill-conceived and unnecessary reification of group '
difference, he argues that' constitutionalism' can establish the sovereignty of a
single South African people while also limiting that authority in ways that
protect minority rights. He maintains that 'liberal-democratic political
institutions provide an attractive normative institutional framework for
accommodating our need to belong to a community and for acknowledging
diverse cultural identities, without sacrificing the individual interest in .
autonomy and impartiality'. From this philosophical starting point, Cachalia
goes on to analyse the South African Constitution and in particular two cultural
rights guarantees, found in sections 30 and 31 of the final Constitution. In •
general, he calls for a broad understanding of cultural rights, and for a sensitive
balancing of those rights against the grounds for limitations upon them. In
particular, as he explains in discussing section 31(2), which makes the exercise
of cultural rights in conjunction with others (protected by section 31(1)) subject·
to the other provisions of the Bill of Rights, 'an absolutist, literal reading of
section 31(2)' would be a mistake because it 'would in effect ... read section
31(1) out of the Constitution, where there is a conflict between dominant,.
majoritarian, secular values and religious and cultural ones. Little scope would '
then remain for any expression of such difference'. As he emphasises, the,
Constitution calls on South Africans 'to reconcile its many competing·
commitments', a far from simple task, but it has also created a Constitutional•
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Court with the ultimate responsibility for this function. As such, Cachalia
co~cl~de~, '[t]he Court is ... not merely.a "counter-majoritarian" but a nationbmldmg institution'.
South _A£i:ica's divisions, of course, are not merely cultural, and achieving
true_equa~ity ~n ~ou~h Africa requires much more than accepting diversity and
barnng discnmmahon. As everyone recognises, the country's vast gulfs of
~ealth_and privilege must also be bridged, and to this end the final Constitution
-ma~ important departure from the Interim Constitution - guarantees a range
of socioeconomic rights.What these rights are to mean, however, has been less
~han clear. Although the Constitutional Court insisted in the certification
{~dgem~nt that these rights were, at l~ast in so~e respects, justiciable, rather
_an bemg merely hortatory declarations - the1r meaning and enforcement
ffill remame
· d to be developed. Sandra Liebenberg focuses
on one enforcement
system, the duty of the Human Rights Commission under section 184(3) of the
C~ns_titution
· to 'require relevant organs of state to provide the Commission
with information on the measures that they have taken towards the realisation
of t~e rights in the Bill of Rights concerning housing, health care, food, water,
:ocial secur~ty, education and the environment'. Drawing especially on the
Sn~erstandmgs developed under the International Covenant on Economic,
~cial and Cultural Rights - a document that influenced South Africa's own
~ill 0 ~ ~ghts - she sets out a comprehensive and far-reaching framework for
~dentifying violations of the socio-economic rights, based on the state's duty
t? respect', 'to protect' and 'to promote and fulfil' the rights articulated in the
Bill 0 Rights. Her framework points to many forms of conduct that may
c~nShtute violations, including' arbitrary termination of social security benefits
without
a fa1r
· h earm
· g' - a d epnvation
· · of access to social security, and hence
·
a
.
failure to 'respect' this right; the lack of effective legal remedies by which
:mber~ of relative~y pow:rle~s groups, ~uch as women, can protect themselves
m socio-economic depnvat10ns - a failure to 'protect' access to these rights·
and _a fai·1 ure by the state ·to make 'decisions ... based on a principled'
consideration of the resources required to meet its constitutional commitments
;s. a matter of priority'. The duty to 'progressively' achieve these rights - a
. allure to_ 'promote and fulfil' these rights. Utilising the theory and practice of
International enforcement, Liebenberg outlines comprehensively the
P;ocedural, substantive and participatory steps that need to be in place to give
e feet to these obligations.s
. St ephen Ellmann also considers the scope of South Africa's socio-economic
nghts
·
·1y mt
· h e context o f exammmg
. -.
.
, but pnman
another question· the
mterp t ti
. .
·
re a on of the provis10ns that extend the Constitution's reach to private
actors: 01:1-e such provision, section 239, defines 'organs of state' - to which the
Constitution n
. language that potentially encompasses
ecessan·1y app1·ies - m
many seemingly private 'functionar[ies] orinstitution[ s]'. Another, section 8(2),
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declares in strikingly ambiguous terms that '[a] provision of the Bill of Rights
binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable,
taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of ariy duty imposed
by the right'. Ellmann approaches the interpretation of these two clauses in
light of American jurisprudence deciding when state action - normally a
requirement for the application of the US Constitution - is present. With this
jurisprudence in mind, he argues that a number of not-entirely-public
institutions do fall under section 239, but that the main work of applying the
Constitution to private actors should be done under the rubric of section 8(2).
As to 8(2), Ellmann argues that although it clearly makes the Bill of Rights
potentially applicable to altogether private actors, the section should be
interpreted to include an inquiry into the extent of the connections between
the 'private' actor and the state. An actor's connections with the state, Ellmann
maintains, help to measure the potential harm that actor can do, the moral
responsibility others should feel, and the moral claims to exemption from public
duties that the actor may have. These suggestions, he hopes, will assist the
South African courts as they undertake to extend the domain of constitutional
rights from a focus just on the behaviour of the state to a concern with the
behaviour of citizens as well.
Against this background of constitutional innovation, protecting the right
of free speech might seem almost routine. But the long-established status of
this right in constitutional democracies does not mean its force is spent. On the
contrary, as Woolman and Majola demonstrate, the implications of the right of
free speech are likely to be felt in many fields of South African life, some of
them perhaps unexpected. Writing in light of the massive statutory suppression
of speech under apartheid, Woolman and Majola focus on an area of law for .
which the courts were primarily responsible, the common law of contempt. ·
Referring to a range of cases running up to the late 1980s, they document a
disturbing record of courts' privileg[ing] the interests of the judiciary and other ,
legal institutions over the interests of free speech, fair trials, individual rights '
and unfettered public discourse'. In 1988, the Appellate Division began to reform
this area of law to bring it in line with contemporary jurisprudence elsewhere ·
in the world. Even now, after the adoption of the new Constitution, the authors •
observe that the law of contempt apparently still criminalises a range of·
'expressive conduct', but they take heart from the Constitutional Court's careful
and calm handling of the challenge to its own integrity in the SARFU case.6 '
They consider this decision 'a model for how a public institution ought to
respond to issues that fall along South Africa's many fault lines .... [and] for
how South African courts should engage the occasional reckless accusations
made by litigants'. Finally, the authors outline a constitutional doctrine of
contempt. Such a doctrine would not condone disorderly conduct in the court,•
which obviously needs to be curbed, but might well protect reporting about
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cases that is now barred by the sub judice rule; would surely protect political
criticism of the courts that might in the past have been said to 'scandalise the
court'; and would require much more attention to the fair trial rights of those
individuals who do face charges of contempt.
While these chapters cover many of the most important areas of
constitutional rights protection, their value is not primarily as a survey of areas
of constitutional law. Rather, they all look at the new Constitution as a work in
progress. What the Constitution ultimately means will be a result of the
disciplined reflection of the judges charged with interpreting it, but also of the
focused advocacy of lawyers, the commitments of political parties and the beliefs
of South Africa's people. A constitutional culture is now being built; these essays
both report on it and seek to contribute to its preservation and growth.

The Institutions Created by the New Constitutions
The new constitutions themselves recognised the need for institutional
protections for the democratic South Africa they sought to create. These took a·
variety of forms, some familiar to constitutional observers elsewhere and some
more novel. The contributors to this section of the book assess several of the
most important: the structural allocation of power between the national
government and the provinces; the role of the Constitutional Court, and of the
lower courts and the police; and the functions of the Human Rights
Commission.
Nicholas Haysom focuses his attention on the federal features of South.
Africa's final Constitution, and sketches the tensions between and possibilities
of national and provincial power. His essay begins with an overview of the
negotiations around federalism, a debate so hindered by the history of apartheid
Sou~h Africa's perversion of federalism into the bantustan system that 'the
parties agreed to drop the "F" word and to embark on an inquiry into an
appropriate system of constitutional government whose objective would be to
promote nothing other than good and effective government', government
embodying 'accountability, democracy, effectiveness and efficiency, and the
capacity to cope with regional and cultural diversity'. Even so, these issues
remained intensely contested, and Haysom points out the extensive treatment
of the division of power between the national and provincial governments in
th
e Constitutional Principles through which the Interim Constitution bound
th
e ~rafters of the final Constitution. The Constitutional Court ultimately found
!he first draft of the final Constitution unacceptable in part on the ground that
it had, contrary to the requirement of Principle xviii.2, substantially diminished
th
e powers of the provinces - a conclusion Haysom assesses critically. In any
even~, the model of cooperative government that was ultimately adopted was
predicated on the recognition that different levels of government may have
concomitaht interests in the same governmental functions. To promote
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now shares its power of constitutional review with lower courts, and observes
cooperative federalism the drafters of the final Constitution replaced the Senate
that '[t]he effect of this will be to infuse the Constitution into decisions of the
with the 'National Council of Provinces' (NCOP) which was designed to
court~ and to make South Africa a real constitutional democracy'.
engender a more active and independent role for the provinces in the national
Diana Gordon turns our attention from the Constitutional Court to less
government's decisions, as opposed to the Senate, which tended merely to
lofty
institutions of law enforcement: the lower courts and the police. As she
reflect and reiterate the policies of the national majority party, the ANC. Haysom
emphasises,
'the method by which state power is exercised is no less important
recognises that there is room .to question whether the NCOP is succeeding in
a
measure
of
democracy than the method by which those in authority are
this goal (and whether the provinces are capable of carrying the responsibilities
chosen'. Her paper, part of a larger, ongoing study that aims to evaluate the
the Constitution envisaged for them), but he concludes by offering a reasonably
optimistic prognosis of the functioning of the NCOP which after its first year . trans,formation of the police and courts in post-apartheid _South Africa, finds
that [p]olice and court reform as of early 1999 can best be characterized as
in operation, appeared to have dealt competently with the tasks before it. 'As
processes of ferment and adaptation'. The judges Gordon interviewed 'all
the political landscape changes- and it surely will over time - and if the current
expre~sed firm commitment to extensive institutional reform; they now all
provincial framework remains intact, the NCOP will come into its own.'
repud1a~e apartheid and maintain that they had all along been politically neutral,
While the allocation of power between the national government and the
forced simply to "apply the law as it is". But in her most recent interviews,
provinces will, ideally, promote diversity and protect against an overweening
Gord~n found some judges sceptical of concrete steps taken to appoint more
central government, the body most important to the protection of rights and
blac~
J_udges, and she raises the possibility that the judiciary may become' more
the maintenance of limits on power in South Africa may be the Constitutional
stratified, with lesser cases shifted to lower courts, which will become the
Court. Patric Mtshaulana's essay reminds us how thoroughly the creation of a
tra~ning grounds for black lawyers and magistrates'. Meanwhile, the police
Constitutional Court breaks with _South Africa's past, with its legacy of
officers with whom Gordon spoke have also adopted at least 'the vernacular of
parliamentary supremacy and the failure of the judiciary to protect adequately
change', and throughout Gordon's study have 'said they were relieved not to
the fundamental rights and freedoms of all South Africans. He believes that
ha~e. to be enforcing apartheid any longer and stressed the importance of a
'[b]y bestowing on judges the task of guarding and protecting the supremacy
shift in emphasis from what they called" control" to what they called" service".' .
of the Constitution, the Constitution has sharpened lawyers' sensitivity towards
Gordon emphasises the anxieties and ambivalence police officers expressed
justice. It will probably redeem the profession from an apathy, resignation and
but also finds that 'police monitors and researchers report an impressive amoun;
despair that characterised it in the time of Parliamentary sovereignty.' Moreover,
of effor~, particularly in the townships, to develop more mutually trusting and
Mtshaulana applauds the innovations in the criteria for appointment of
protective
relationships'. She also emphasises that South Africa, with its long,
Constitutional Court judges, namely that they are no longer drawn exclusively
th ou?h troubled, history of 'traditional, non-state methods for maintaining
from the ranks of senior counsel-predominantly whites- but can also include
public safety in many African communities', might be able to develop these
attorneys and academics. At the same time, he analyses the role of the Judicial
n?n~state institutions of community protection ... as exponents of democratic
Service Commission (JSC), the body created to promote transparency in the
criminal justice'.
selection and appointment of judges. He suggests that, although the JSC as
. One of the many creative features of the South African Constitution is that
presently constituted does provide for considerable input from the legal
it does not rely only on courts or police to protect its people's rights. Chapter 9
profession, the role of the State President in appointing JSC members should
of the Constitution also establishes a number of governmental institutions
be cut back, to better insure the independence of the judiciary and avoid the
whose duty is to promote human rights and monitor the government's
politicisati<?n of apartheid days, when the appointment of judges was purely
performance of its functions. Among these is the Human Rights Commission,
at the discretion of the ruling National Party. He is also concerned that the final
~nd Karthy Govender, one of its members, discusses the HRC's structure and
Constitution's reworking of the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court may
its work in his essay. He begins with an examination of the constitutional
have undercut minority political parties in Parliament, by restricting their power
protection of the HRC's independence. On this score he notes that
to present legislation to the Court for 'preventive' review prior to its concrete
ap 0 •
I
P tntments are made on the vote of a majority of the National Assembly,
enforcement. Finally, surveying several of the Constitutional Court's decisions,
nd
~ observes that a special majority requirement (say, a 60 per cent vote) 'would
Mtshaulana discusses the manner in which the Court is developing a
a~e ~eant that the candidate enjoys the confidence of more than just the
constitutional and common law jurisprudence in line with the new
maJonty
party'. He is also troubled by the provision for removal of HRC
constitutional order. He concludes by emphasising that the Constitutional Court
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members by majority vote of the National Assembly, and argues that courts
should stand ready to review removal decisions and that many of the
requirements of natural justice should govern the decision making process in
order to protect the HRC' s independence and impartiality. Similarly, he points
out the importance of ensuring that the HRC is directly accountable to
Parliament and entitled to defend its.budgetary requests before Parliament,
rather than being absorbed under the aegis of one of the government's own
ministries. He notes that '[t]he executive branch of government, Parliament
and the various chapter 9 institutions are in the process of redefining their
relationships' on these lines as the result of a recent Constitutional Court
decision.7 Then Govender turns to the work of the Commission. As he
emphasises, the HRC's mandate is extremely broad, but the Commission has
identified '[t]hree key areas' on which to focus: racism, social and economic
rights, and the administration of justice. He discusses the Commission's work
in each of these fields, ranging from its highly controversial examination of
media racism to its determined efforts to elicit from government departments
the reports on the status of socio-economic rights that the Constitution requires,
and concludes that '[t]he Commission engages with the South African society
in a holistic manner in order to create a rights conscious culture'.
To be sure, only time will tell whether the institutions meant to safeguard
South African democracy succeed in that task. But it is important to understand
the protective structures South Africa has put in place, and to appraise both
their strengths and their imperfections. The essays in this section thus provide
both an historical snapshot of the new systems at work, and a guide for political
actors and citizens concerned to make these systems as strong and as protective
as they can be.

1

Matthew Chaskalson has traced the process that produced the Interim Constitution's
property provision in a fascinating article, 'Stumbling Towards Section 28:
Negotiations over the Protection of Property Rights in the Interim Constitution,'
1995 (11) SAJHR 222.

2

Martin Chanock, 'South Africa: legal formalism and legal culture in a new state'
(unpublished paper, 1998).
'
Trop v. Dulles, 356 US 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
Larbi-Odam and Others v The Member of the Executive Council for Education
(North-West Province) and Another 1_998 (1) SA 745 (CC).
The Constitutional Court has very recently confirmed that it too views the obligations
of the socio-economic rights provisions as substantial and enforceable. See
Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others,
CCT 11/00 (Constitutional Court, 4 October 2000).
Pre~ident of the Republic of South Africa and others v South African Rugby Football
Union and others 1999(4) SA 147 (CC).
New National Party of South Africa v Government of the Republic of South Africa
1999 (3) SA 191 (CC).
'

3
4

5

6

7

Conclusion
South Africa's 'rights conscious culture' is still being born and shaped. If
American history is any guide, the only certainty may be that South Africa will
soon encounter problems and devise solutions that will respond to exigencies
the framers did not foresee. If the new Constitution is a success, however, the
rights it protects and the institutions it establishes will continue to govern the
nation for years, and even generations, to come. It is our hope that this book
will help illuminate the genesis of this remarkable new rights culture, candidly
identify the problems and challenges that it faces, and assist in its full realisation.
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